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The Economic
Context

Growing Disparities of
Income and Wealth

Chuck Collins

In the last few years, poverty rates have remained constant in the New
England states. The effort to reduce poverty in New England and the
United States has been thwarted by trends of growing income and wealth
inequality. Since the late 1970s, the real incomes for the majority of U.S.
households have remained stagnant or fallen. During the same time, asset
ownership has become dramatically more unequal, and the concentration
of wealth in the hands of a few has increased. The causes of this accelerated inequality are complex, but underlying the picture are a series of rule
changes, both public policies and private corporate practices. These
include public policies governing taxation, global trade, labor rules, and
government spending priorities.These rules have favored asset owners at
the expense of wage earners.

T

he economic health of the United States could be summed up on a T-shirt
spotted recently at a New England county fair: “I lived through ten years
of unprecedented economic prosperity and all I got was this lousy T-shirt.”
“The reality is that the U.S. society is polarizing and its social arteries are
hardening,” said Will Hutton, a British commentator on U.S. society. “The
sumptuousness and bleakness of the respective lifestyle of the rich and poor
represent a scale of difference in opportunity and wealth that is also medieval
— and a standing offence to the American expectation that everyone has the
opportunity for life, liberty, and happiness.”
In hearing Hutton, many of us might defensively respond that at least U.S.
inequality is not as severe as that in countries like Brazil. Brazil, after all, is a
society where a small, wealthy elite drives their bullet-proof Mercedes Benzes
from their gated residential enclave to their walled shopping district enclave
(or if they are very wealthy they take helicopters). Meanwhile the great mass
of people are living in sprawling slums in severe depravation.

Chuck Collins is the co-founder and Associate Director of United for a Fair Economy in
Boston. He is co-author, with Bill Gates, Sr., of Wealth and Our Commonwealth: Why
America Should Tax Accumulated Fortunes.

It is true that U.S. inequalities are not as extreme as Brazil’s, but the signs of
the times in our country should give us pause. The economic prosperity of the
1990s was remarkable in many regards — and the technologically driven
increase in productivity made many people very wealthy. But the benefits of
the 1990s “boom” were very uneven, and if we look at the whole picture, the
last three decades have seen growing income and wealth inequality.
For individuals and families attempting to rise out of poverty, there have
been a number of structural economic forces thwarting the climb. A “poverty
framework,” looking solely at the experience of individuals in poverty, fails to
take into account the changing U.S. and global economy and the trends of
growing economic inequality. A large part of this story has to do with stagnant
wages, the changing structure of work, and growing disparities of wealth.

Wages, Work, and Wealth:
A Quarter Century of
Growing Inequality
In the thirty years after World War II, the growth in wages was experienced all
across the economic spectrum. Wage earners in the lowest-income quintile saw
their real incomes rise 116 percent between 1947 and 1979. At the same time,
the middle quintile and the top quintile saw their income’s rise 111 percent and
99 percent respectively. Simply looking at family income, the “rising tide”
really did lift all boats.1
This contrasts sharply with the story of wages and income between 1979
and 2000, which could be characterized as a dramatic pulling apart. With the
exception of a few good years at the end of the 1990s, when some of the gains
of the 1990s economic boom were experienced more broadly, incomes for the
bottom half of the population fell or remained stagnant over this period.
Between 1979 and 2000, the bottom quintile saw their real after-tax incomes grow 9 percent. The middle and top quintiles saw their real after-tax
incomes rise 15 percent and 68 percent respectively. But if we break out the
top quintiles into different segments, we see that the most dramatic pulling
apart is at the very top of the economic ladder.
The highest 1 percent of income earners, those with incomes in 2003
exceeding $337,000, saw their real incomes rise 201 percent between 1979
and 2000.2 In 2000, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
this top 1 percent of the U.S. population took home a bigger slice of after tax
income than at any time during the previous seventy years. The 1 million
households at the top received more income than the forty million households
at the bottom of the income spectrum.3
In Massachusetts, income inequality increased over the same period. The
Commonwealth ranked as the fifth most unequal state in the country, as
demonstrated by the richest fifth of income earners and the poorest fifth.4
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Between the late 1980s and the late 1990s, the bottom 40 percent of income
earners in Massachusetts saw their real incomes decline 7 percent, reflecting
the unevenness of the economic boom in the state.5
Another indicator of U.S. inequality is the disparity between average worker
pay and top management pay in America’s largest corporations. In 1980, the
ratio between the paychecks of the highest paid and average employee was 42
to 1. Today, according to the Business Week’s annual survey, the ratio is over
400 to 1, a ten-fold increase in compensation inequality.6
Looking at the U.S. economy through the lens of wages and income, it
would be accurate to characterize the three decades after World War II as a
time of “growing together,” whereas the last 25 years has been a time of
“pulling apart.”

Work in the New Economy
Part of the explanation for growing wage disparities is because the nature of
work itself has changed since the years after World War II. Employers in the
post-war years shared more of the prosperity of those decades with their workers. Wages steadily rose and the percentage of jobs with health care coverage,
employer-funded pensions and long-term security increased. Workers without
college educations could still secure high paying jobs in U.S. manufacturing. And
a single income could provide a family with a decent standard of living.
U.S. social policy contributed to a post–war middle class expansion with
enormous public investments in higher education and low-interest mortgages for
first-time homebuyers. Between 1945 and 1968, the percentage of American
families living in owner-occupied dwellings rose from 44 percent to 63 percent.7
But since the mid-1970s there has been a steady shift in the nature of the
job itself. The “new economy” job pays less, has little long-term security, and
fewer benefits associated with the job. A higher percentage of jobs are in the
temporary or “contingent” workforce without security. The “Walmartization”
of the economy has seen a growing number of employers paying poverty
wages with minimal benefits. In one cartoon a politician boasts at a black tie
dinner, “My administration has created 8 million new jobs.” The waiter at the
banquet concurs: “I know. I have three of them.” A household needs several of
these “new economy” jobs to hold life together.
The Wealth Gap
Income and the changing nature of work provide one dimension of America’s
“apartheid economy.” But an examination of wealth disparities reveals a more
startling picture of inequality than income.
In the years after World War II, not only did incomes for all households
double, there was an enormous broadening of wealth in the form of savings
and homeownership. In 1976, after several decades of public policies aimed at
broadening wealth, the top 1 percent of households owned 19 percent of all
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private wealth. By 2001 the share of wealth owned by the top 1 percent of
households was 33 percent. To join this richest 1 percent that year you needed
to have at least $3 million in net worth. The richest 5 percent of U.S. households controlled over 59 percent of the country’s wealth; the richest 20 percent
held 83 percent. At the same time, the bottom 80 percent of households had
17 percent of the wealth pie and the bottom 40 percent had just 0.3 percent.8
For the majority of Americans, their wealth is in the form of
homeownership. Taking homeownership out of the picture and looking at
“financial wealth,” the picture is even more skewed. The wealthiest 1 percent
own 42.1 percent of financial wealth, while the bottom 90 percent has 21.3.9
The “dot com” technology bust deflated some of the paper wealth of this
wealthiest group. But at the highest reaches of America’s wealth ladder, recent
wealth assessments indicate that there has been a resurgence of millionaires in
the United States and worldwide. The number of individuals with at least $1
million in financial or liquid assets jumped from 2 million to 2.27 million
households between 2002 and 2003.10
Almost one fifth of the population, mostly located the bottom of the income
ladder, have no wealth or savings. They may owe more than they own. Nearly
31 percent of black households and more than 13 percent of white households
are “assetless,” possessing zero or negative net worth.11
The racial wealth divide is even more dramatic and underscores how the
legacy of discrimination in lending practices, business ownership, and job
opportunities has thwarted wealth opportunities for people of color. In 2001,
the typical black household had a net worth of just $19,000, including home
equity, compared with $121,000 for whites. Blacks had 16 percent of the
median wealth of whites, up from 5 percent in 1989. This is progress, but at
this rate it will take until 2099 to reach parity in median wealth.12
Many low- and middle-income households have seen their savings erode
and wages stagnate. They’ve compensated for these changes by increasing the
number of hours they work in the paid workforce and by taking on unprecedented levels of personal debt. While longer work hours and personal debt
have masked inequality trends, they’ve come at enormous personal cost to
individual families and are not sustainable.
These trends in wealth are troubling on their own, but they also have wider
societal implications. Concentrations of wealth are also concentrations of
social and political power. As wealth concentrates in fewer hands, so does the
power to influence the rules that govern our society and the economy.

Why Has This Happened?
While the 1950s and 1960s were still times of economic inequality, prosperity
was shared significantly better than during the last couple of decades. Why
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was inequality declining in the 1950s and 1960s? Why has inequality grown so
dramatically in the last two decades? There is no simple answer.
For most economists, politicians, and media professionals, growing inequality is not even newsworthy. Of those who acknowledge this phenomenon,
most attribute it to unnamed “market forces.” Most orthodox economists
point to three primary reasons for growing inequality: changing technology,
lack of education (resulting from technological change), and globalization.13
As James K. Galbraith writes in Created Unequal: The Crisis in American Pay,
“To a predominant faction within the economics profession, the ‘why’ of rising
inequality has been answered by a single, all-encompassing phrase: skill-based
technological change.”14 This basic theory states that workers in our economy
have not kept up with dramatic changes in technology, creating a shortage of
highly skilled people who have made the leap into the new technological arena
and whose services, by virtue of supply and demand, command high salaries.
The labor of under-skilled workers, on the other hand, is less valued, so their
wages plummet. The policy implications of this are, if anything, to invest in
worker training and education and sit back and wait for the supply of skilled
workers to catch up to demand.
Galbraith challenges this theory, arguing that rising wage inequality is
neither “mysterious nor necessary nor the dark side of a good thing.” Rather,
it is the result of recession, unemployment, slow economic growth, inflation,
and a stagnant minimum wage. It is the result of changes in the rules that
govern the economy — at least two decades of public policies and private
corporate practices — that have benefited asset owners at the expense of wage
earners. Tax policy, global trade policy, government spending, and regulation
have all been tilted in favor of asset owners and large corporations.
Technological change and global competition do contribute to inequality.
Yet even in these areas there are political decisions and rules that govern how
we choose to evolve technologically and how we integrate into the global
economy. Other nations have experienced technological change and global
integration without the same dramatic increases in inequality.15 Inequality will
be reduced through policies such as increasing employment, controlling the
negative effects of globalization, and raising the minimum wage.
There have always been great inequalities of wealth and power, but the
imbalance of power has accelerated in the last two decades as result of a
power shift. Corporations, investors, and campaign donors gained power
while main street businesses, wage earners, and voters have lost power. As
political influence has shifted, the rules governing the economy have changed
to benefit asset owners and large corporations at the expense of wage earners.
These rule changes are government actions and corporate practices that
have worsened the wealth and income divide, putting a heavy thumb on the
scale in favor of the rich and powerful. The federal government has changed
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the rules governing taxes, trade, wages, spending priorities, and monetary
policy. In each case, the government has acted on behalf of corporations and
the rich to rig who wins and who loses in the economy.
One example of a rule change that has affected workers is their ability to
join unions. As corporate power has increased, the power of workers, communities, consumers, and others has decreased. In the 1950s, when prosperity was
shared relatively more equitably, 35 percent of the U.S. workforce was represented by a labor union. By 1983, that number had dropped to 20.1 percent.
Today, less than 13.9 percent of the workforce is unionized and fewer than one
in ten workers in the private workforce is in a union. In 1998, more than
100,000 people joined unions, but the number of new jobs in the economy
grew even faster, so the percentage of workers in unions declined overall.16
This represents a tremendous loss in clout for the institutional voice of wage
workers, a voice that continually asks “Hey, what about the workers?”
whenever national economic policies were debated.
During the years after World War II, unions were a countervailing force to
the power of domestic and transnational corporations. These unions enforced
a “social contract” ensuring that the fruits of economic growth were shared.
This sharing was not entirely equitable, as many unions excluded people of
color and women from their ranks. But evidence is clear that unions raised the
standard of living for most low- and moderate-income people, whether they
joined unions or not.
Another example of rule changes that affect our lowest income neighbors
relate to the weakening of the social safety net. Over the last two decades, we
have witnessed a reversal in state and federal government programs that
historically worked to narrow economic inequalities. Cuts in social spending
increase Americans’ reliance on unequal personal income and savings and
guarantee a growing divide between rich and poor.
For example, the restructuring of welfare and the elimination of federal
college assistance have weakened the ladder of economic opportunity. Federal
Pell Grants, created in 1972 to provide aid to working-class college students,
are much less generous than they used to be. The maximum Pell Grant in
1975–76 covered 84 percent of the average cost of attending a four-year public
institution, today it covers just 39 percent of that cost.
The situation will only worsen in the coming decade. The Bush
administration’s proposed 2005 budget includes $1 billion in cuts for Section 8
housing vouchers. These vouchers help 2 million poor, elderly and disabled
Americans pay their rent. A $1 billion cut would amount to 5.5 percent of the
program’s total funding.
The Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, which the administration’s 2005
budget proposes to make permanent, guarantee further cuts to social spending.
The 2001 tax cut was the largest income tax rollback in two decades, and the
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2003 cut reduced dividend and capital gains taxes while accelerating the 2001
rate cut for the top income brackets. These tax cuts, which mainly benefit the
rich, will cost at least $824.1 billion between 2001 and 2010. If extended, they
will cost $5.9 trillion over the next seventy-five years. Revenue losses of this
magnitude can only be sustained by cutting social programs.

Wanted: A Real Opportunity
Society
It has not always been like this. Throughout U.S. history are multiple examples
of ways that our government has helped to level the playing field and expand the
wealth and security of many of its citizens. After the Civil War, the government
gave millions of acres of land to homesteaders. In the two decades after World
War II, the white middle class was greatly expanded thanks to massive government scholarships for higher education and subsidies for affordable housing and
small business development. Our government provided low-interest mortgages
to homebuyers, enabling millions of people to get on board the wealth-building
train. In both historical periods, however, people of color were left standing at
the train station because of discrimination in these programs. The Economic
Opportunity Act and fair housing laws were attempts to address persistent
poverty and discrimination and ensure greater opportunity.
We must work to overcome the perpetuation of income and wealth inequality and the barriers they present to equality of opportunity. The accumulated
advantages and disadvantages of inequality are like sediment. The accumulated opportunities for those with wealth build up, layer upon layer, from the
previous generation’s wealth, education, and opportunity. And the accumulated disadvantages of inadequate income and no wealth and savings deepen
the hole of discrimination, poverty, debt, and unequal opportunity. We will not
be able to adequately address poverty without challenging the structural
changes in the economy that fuel a growing income and wealth inequality.
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